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There has been a dramatic spread of market relationships in many low- and
middle-income countries. This spread has been much faster than the develop-
ment of the institutional arrangements to influence the performance of health
service providers. In many countries poor people obtain a large proportion of
their outpatient medical care and drugs from informal providers working outside
a regulatory framework, with deleterious consequences in terms of the safety
and efficacy of treatment and its cost. Interventions that focus only on improving
the knowledge of these providers have had limited impact. There is a consid-
erable amount of experience in other sectors with interventions for improving
the performance of markets that poor people use. This paper applies lessons from
this experience to the issue of informal providers, drawing on the findings of
studies in Bangladesh and Nigeria. These studies analyse the markets for
informal health care services in terms of the sources of health-related knowledge
for the providers, the livelihood strategies of these providers and the institutional
arrangements within which they build and maintain their reputation. The paper
concludes that there is a need to build a systematic understanding of these
markets to support collaboration between key actors in building institutional
arrangements that provide incentives for better performance.
Keywords Informal providers, health markets, regulation, accountability
KEY MESSAGES
 In many countries, poor people secure a substantial proportion of their outpatient medical care from informal providers
working outside a formal regulatory framework. There are problems with the efficacy, safety and cost of these services.
 The health sector can learn from the experience of other sectors in improving the performance of markets that mostly
serve the needs of the poor.
 Effective interventions need to take into account the sources of knowledge and drugs for these providers, the livelihood
strategies of providers and the institutional arrangements within which these providers establish and maintain their
reputation within their community.
Introduction
Over recent decades, there has been a dramatic spread of
market relationships in the health sector of many low- and
middle-income countries (Mackintosh and Koivusalo 2005).
Out-of-pocket payments typically account for a substantial
proportion of total health expenditure, and a very large propor-
tion of health care transactions in both public and private
sectors include some form of cash payment (WHO 2007).
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Indeed, the categorization of services as ‘public’ and ‘private’
often seems simplistic. Many countries have pluralistic health
systems in which providers of health-related goods and services
vary widely, in terms of their practice settings, type of knowledge
and associated training, extent of public subsidy and relation-
ship with the legal system (Bloom and Standing 2001).
The spread of markets has been much faster in many
countries than the creation of effective regulatory arrangements
to influence their performance (Bloom et al. 2009). Many
providers, including a substantial proportion of public employ-
ees, operate with limited regard for any legal or regulatory
framework. The extent to which regulations are enforced is
typically constrained by limited resources, inadequate under-
standing by regulators of their role and a lack of incentives to
take action, especially against those whom they may regard as
fellow health workers (Ensor and Weinzierl 2006). In many
cases the health system is highly segmented, with the better off
benefiting from institutions such as health insurance and
relatively effective regulatory frameworks, while the poor rely
largely on informal markets.
Informal practitioners provide a large proportion of outpatient
health care in India and Bangladesh (Chowdhury et al. 2008;
Kanjlal et al. 2008), and are widespread across Africa, where
traditional healers and pharmacy vendors have long been
known to provide much of the outpatient care (Oshiname and
Brieger 1992). The term ‘informal’ includes a great variety of
providers who routinely or occasionally undertake activities for
which they do not possess the required medical certification, as
assessed by health authorities and/or legislation covering the
provision of health services. This includes practitioners from a
variety of healing traditions as well as those based on
professionalized biomedicine. This paper focuses mostly on
the latter. Some of their activities may be clearly illegal, for
example selling prescription drugs without a required license,
while the status of other activities is hazy in terms of existing
regulatory frameworks. A recent review of the anthropological
literature on informal providers by Cross and Macgregor (2010)
emphasizes the position of these providers on the boundaries of
legitimacy in terms of their relationship to formal and informal
institutions.
The spread of health-related markets has enabled many poor
people to gain access to previously unavailable drugs and
medical services, but it has also left them at substantial risk
from costly, poor quality, inappropriate and sometimes poten-
tially dangerous medical care. New approaches are needed to
improve the performance of these markets, particularly in
meeting the needs of the poor. This cannot be achieved by
simply importing regulatory frameworks and approaches from
the advanced market economies. Strategies are needed to build
institutions adapted to very different contexts. This paper aims
to stimulate debate about the design and implementation of
such strategies. It applies an analytical framework for analysing
markets and potential interventions to the findings of studies in
Bangladesh and Nigeria (Oladepo et al. 2007; Bhuiya 2009).
Understanding health-related markets
The advanced market economies have created complex institu-
tional arrangements to facilitate co-operation between state,
market and civil society actors in translating scientific medical
knowledge into widely accessible goods and expert services
(Bloom et al. 2008). Debates about health system organization,
based on a combination of economic theory and historical
evidence, have led to a widely held consensus on why markets,
in themselves, do not produce efficient or equitable health
systems. This consensus characterizes the health sector in terms
of a number of well-understood ‘market failures’ (Bennett et al.
1997). A variety of formal and informal arrangements have
arisen to compensate for these failures. For example, a range of
non-market institutions, such as professional self-regulation
and internalized codes of ethics, public provision of services,
government regulation and tort law, have developed to prevent
possessors of expert knowledge from abusing their power.
Markets also have a capacity for self-regulation since market
share is often protected by demonstrated adherence to rules
and standards. In many countries, providers will also be subject
to oversight by a range of community or patient-based
organizations and the print and electronic media.
North (1990) stresses the importance of agreed and enforced
rules, and associated expectations and behavioural norms, in
facilitating the effective performance of markets. The absence of
well-functioning institutions which underwrite and enforce
these is a feature of major failures of both states and markets
in many low- and middle-income countries (Chang 2007). It is
often precisely the same factors that contribute to both types of
failure which can be seen as jointly responsible for a range of
current problems in the health sector, including counterfeit
drugs, inappropriate use of anti-microbial and anti-viral agents
and widespread problems with the quality and cost of care.
Analyses of ‘government failure’ in many low- and
middle-income countries note that government employees,
including health workers, do not behave like ‘Weberian
bureaucrats’, who are paid a salary and provided with good
career prospects in exchange for acting in the interest of the
population. Performance is influenced more by financial
incentives and political and patronage relationships. In many
instances there is a fine line between market-like behaviour
that has accrued a degree of legitimacy and behaviour that is
socially understood to be corrupt (Lewis 2006; Vian 2008). For
example, some informal payments to service providers may be
regarded as ‘fair’, in a context of very low public sector pay,
while other payments may be viewed as exploitative. There is
an equally difficult-to-define line between the use of regulatory
powers for the public good, for the protection of specific
stakeholders from competition and for the provision of
opportunities for rent-seeking by regulators. Interventions that
do not take this reality into account can have unintended
consequences (Pritchett and Woolcock 2004).
Institutional arrangements perform a range of functions in
health systems. One of the most important is the empowerment
of patients with respect to providers, for example by reducing
information asymmetries (Arrow 1963) whereby the additional
knowledge possessed by a provider often places them in a
position of considerable advantage in any discussion of appro-
priate treatments. The overall aim is ‘the creation of conditions
for trust in the competence and ethics of providers’ (Gilson
2003). In the absence of such confidence, users may be forced
to risk substandard treatment, invest a lot of time and/or
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resources in seeking a competent provider, or forego the
potential benefits of health care. It is also necessary to establish
institutional arrangements that persuade providers that they
will benefit from a reputation for skill and ethical behaviour in
terms of income, future career prospects, social status and
influence.
One way to understand the role of such mutually reinforcing
institutional arrangements is in terms of fostering ‘social
contracts’ between actors, such as health workers, their clients
and people responsible for financing and/or regulating health
services (Bloom et al. 2008). These contracts embody the
expectations necessary for the establishment and maintenance
of trust-based relationships and reflect broader understandings
of social reciprocity in a given population. In relation to health
care, they enable people to purchase drugs without worrying
about their safety and efficacy, and consult possessors of
medical knowledge with confidence in their expertise and
ethics. They also make possible the establishment of insurance
schemes to which people contribute money in the expectation
they will have support should they eventually fall ill.
In the advanced market economies, regulatory systems for
health-related markets tend to be based on collaboration
between the state and other stakeholders. For example, drug
regulatory systems were typically established in close consult-
ation with the pharmaceutical industry and reflect a balance
between public and stakeholder interests (Abraham 1995).
Some argue that the balance has favoured powerful stakehold-
ers, but most agree that some form of collaborative arrange-
ment was necessary. Many governments have tried to create
similar structures without the direct involvement of industry
actors so that large international companies have taken little
responsibility for the use of their products in these countries.
The result has often been weakly regulated health markets,
both nationally and internationally. One encouraging response
has been the recent emergence in some low-income countries of
regulatory partnerships (‘co-production’) between government
and other actors (Joshi and Moore 2004). One example is the
growing willingness of pharmaceutical companies to participate
in efforts to stop the trade in counterfeit products (Pfizer 2004).
Although these regulatory arrangements are subject to the
influence of narrow interests, they also reflect the recognition
by these actors that they have a shared interest in the creation
of a trusted and effective health system.
A recent body of work focuses on how markets in countries
with less-developed formal institutions can be made to work
better for poor people (DFID and SDC 2008; Elliot et al. 2008).
It emphasizes the crucial role that markets play in mediating
relationships between providers and users of goods and
services, and argues that it is important to understand them
as complex systems which can perform well or badly. Figure 1
illustrates the multiple and interrelated institutions which
influence market function. At the centre are the exchanges
Figure 1 Conceptualizing market systems. Source: Adapted from Elliot et al. (2008: Figure 3)
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between providers and consumers of the relevant goods and
services. These exchanges are governed by the interplay of
formal and informal rules, whose establishment and enforce-
ment involves actors who are, in turn, influenced by a variety of
factors. Supporting functions provide an environment within
which the performance of market players may be enhanced or
constrained. This environment also includes multiple actors and
organizations, legal regulations and the norms and values of
suppliers and users of goods and services. Given these inter-
actions between the different elements of a market system,
Elliot et al. (2008) argue that interventions that focus too
narrowly on specific aspects, for example strengthening the
management of a given organization or changing particular
macro-economic policies, are likely to fail. Reforms need to
bridge micro, meso and macro levels in building institutions
that contribute to improved market performance.
The relationships in the above model also reflect and, to some
extent, reinforce relationships of power. For example, in many
countries the organized medical profession strongly opposes
measures to improve the performance of non-professional
providers used mostly by the poor (Dussault 2008). Large
pharmaceutical companies often oppose measures that threaten
their markets. Markets are frequently segmented, with actors
that serve different social groups following different rules and
behavioural norms. Institutional arrangements are always
negotiated in relation to these realities. Strategies to alter the
performance of market systems must be based on an assess-
ment of the political and social context and identification of
significant power relationships between actors (Bloom 2001).
A market systems analysis of informal
providers
Reviews of interventions to influence private providers (a term
employed more generally to cover a wide range of providers not
directly employed by the state) have acknowledged both the
importance of informal providers as a source of health-related
goods and services for the poor, and the special challenges
governments face in attempting to improve their performance
(Mills et al. 2002; Waters et al. 2003; Peters et al. 2004). A recent
review by Shah et al. (2010) of the evidence on the impact of
interventions to improve the performance of informal providers
identified 70 studies that met their criteria for inclusion.
Although training of informal providers was the most common
intervention, in line with the arguments of Elliott et al. (2008)
and Cross and McGregor (2010), such interventions were
relatively ineffective on their own, and worked best when
combined with strategies that altered institutional relationships
and the incentives informal providers face. The more successful
examples tended to require the measurement and disclosure of
performance. A review by Goodman et al. (2007) of the malaria
treatment purchased from medicine sellers in sub-Saharan
Africa similarly concluded that effective strategies for improving
their performance combined training with measures to modify
incentives.
This section applies a market system analysis to informal
providers as a demonstration of how this might offer alterna-
tive entry points for improving their performance and/or
reducing harm from their operation. It focuses on recent
empirical studies of village doctors (‘quacks’) in Bangladesh
and the supply of anti-malarial treatment by patent medicine
vendors (PMVs) in Nigeria. The data on Bangladesh are derived
from a 2007 study in Chakaria sub-district, on the southeastern
coast of the Bay of Bengal. It included visits to every village to
produce an inventory, categorization and map of all providers,
structured interviews with the 328 informal village doctors
practicing in the sub-district (Iqbal et al. 2009), a questionnaire
survey of a random sample of 1000 households on their health
seeking behaviour (Mahmood et al. 2010), exit interviews of
236 randomly chosen patients seeking care from 50 randomly
chosen village doctors (Iqbal et al. 2009) and a study of the role of
representatives of drug wholesalers as a source of information to
drug sellers (Rahman et al. 2009). The data on Nigeria are derived
from physical inspection of the premises of 106 drug shops;
interviews with 110 PMVs and 113 households selected through a
multi-stage random process in six urban and six rural local
government areas in Oyo, Kaduna and Enugu States; and
interviews with 54 community leaders and 55 officers of PMV
associations from these areas (Oladepo et al. 2007).
Both studies documented the high proportion of households
who obtain treatment from an informal provider. In Chakaria,
65% of people who visited a health care provider during the 2
weeks prior to the survey consulted a village doctor as a first
contact (Mahmood et al. 2010). In Nigeria, 39% of people
reported that they obtained treatment for their last episode of
malaria from a PMV and another 25% took medicine they had
previously obtained from a shop (Oladepo et al. 2007).
These studies confirm findings in other countries of problems
with the quality of the services of informal providers (Wachter
et al. 1999; Syhakhang et al. 2001). In Bangladesh, a review of
89 cases from the exit survey found that 18.4% of the drugs
used for treating diarrhoea, pneumonia, fever and cold were
appropriate according to relevant treatment guidelines, 7.1%
were harmful (for example, the over-prescription of steroids)
and 74.5% were unnecessary but not dangerous (Iqbal et al.
2009). In Nigeria, only 9% of the sample of shops stocked
the recommended first-line malaria treatment (artemisinin
combination therapy), whereas 92% of shops had non-
recommended sulfadoxine-pyramethamine and 72% had
chloroquine. Of greater concern was the fact that 32% of
shops stocked monotherapy artesunate, which is contraindi-
cated because of its potential to contribute to drug resistance.
In the light of these findings, the challenge was to design
interventions to reduce harm and improve the treatment
practices of informal providers. Exemplifying the value of
taking a health market systems approach, the analysis of the
intervention options in these two cases focuses on the intercon-
nectedness of the sources of knowledge of informal providers,
the financial incentives that informal providers face, and the
formal and informal institutional arrangements that affect their
local reputation. It shows how this interconnectedness system-
atically influences the performance of informal providers.
Where do informal providers get their knowledge
and products?
Iqbal et al. (2009) found that the Bangladesh village doctors
obtained their medical knowledge from several sources.
Seventy-four per cent said that they had attended one or
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more short courses on health care topics. However, only 5.3%
had been trained as paramedics or paraprofessionals. A second
source of information was practical experience as an apprentice.
Half the village doctors had been a trainee in a pharmacy or an
assistant to a licensed medical doctor or to a village doctor. This
provided them with an opportunity to copy the prescribing
practices of established health workers and perpetuate their
good and bad practices.
Informal providers are part of a chain for the distribution and
marketing of pharmaceuticals and their performance is influ-
enced by the actors in this chain. A study by Rahman et al.
(2009) found that the agents of a number of drug wholesalers
visited Chakaria District regularly. All the village doctors
interviewed said that these agents were their principal source
of information on new drugs. These drug detail men competed
for orders by giving gifts to village doctors, who bought their
products. They also provided advice on how to increase sales
and income. The Nigeria study found that 40% of PMVs were
unaware of government advice that the new malaria treatment
of choice was artemesinin combination therapy. It also found
that the Nigerian public was sceptical when the government
first announced that people should use a much more expensive
product than the one they had been using for years (Oladepo
et al. 2007). This contributed to continued demand for the
cheaper products. The organization of pharmaceutical distribu-
tion varies between states. In the North, the PMVs buy from
large wholesalers, but in Oyo State they mostly use open
markets. The study did not explore the kinds of information
and advice these different types of wholesalers provided, nor
the incentives they provided to the PMVs. One problem with
Nigeria’s pharmaceutical sector is the high proportion of
sub-standard products. Despite big efforts by that country’s
Food and Drug Administration to find and destroy counterfeit
drugs, the PMVs reported that this was a major concern. They
relied mostly on alerts from pharmaceutical companies and the
mass media to avoid purchasing counterfeit drugs.
In both countries, the informal providers said they wanted
training on how to treat common problems, but the govern-
ment did not provide this kind of training. The recent
experience of a medical advice centre run by a major telephone
company in Bangladesh illustrates their wish for this kind of
information. This centre provided advice over the telephone by
qualified doctors. An internal survey by the call centre provider
found that its users included a significant number of village
doctors (Zakir 2010).
Bangladesh and Nigeria have dynamic print and broadcast
media and a growing advertising industry, which produces
content for these media. Many of the products the informal
providers and drug sellers supply are publicized through these
channels. This is an important source of information for both
users and sellers. This raises important issues about whether
government should regulate advertising of these products and
whether it should publicize advice on drug treatment of
common conditions.
Livelihood strategies and the incentives to sell
pharmaceuticals
A number of studies have underlined the need to understand
the livelihood strategies of informal providers before designing
interventions. It is helpful to view informal providers and drug
sellers as people managing a small business at the fringes of the
organized economy (Pinto 2004). The need to build and sustain
a successful business strongly influences their behaviour.
They have strong incentives to encourage their clients to buy
more products. In Bangladesh, village doctors do not charge for
consultations so they rely on selling drugs to make a living.
They need to build a stable customer base by offering credit,
being available through the day and night (unlike their
counterparts in government facilities), speaking sympathetically
and providing what are believed to be effective drugs. The
village doctors reported that they need to comply with their
clients’ wishes and argued that if they tried to supply fewer
steroids, for example, people would take their business
elsewhere. The Nigerian PMVs also responded to their clients’
preferences, supplying low cost anti-malarial drugs despite
government warnings that an increasing proportion of malaria
parasites were resistant to them. This underlines the need to
combine measures to inform providers about dangerous and
ineffective treatments with measures aimed at informing and
influencing their clients.
Building and maintaining a reputation within
the local institutional environment
The studies in Bangladesh and Nigeria revealed that a high
proportion of informal providers had been in business for a
long time. They had to maintain a good reputation to compete
with newcomers. The interviews with community members
in Bangladesh, for example, revealed the high regard with
which these practitioners are held as often well-respected
members of their communities (Sharmin et al. 2009).
Discussions with community representatives in Nigeria revealed
similar perceptions.
The behaviour of informal providers is strongly influenced by
the institutional context within which they are embedded. They
have established a niche because neither government health
facilities nor private providers have adequately met the popu-
lation’s needs. The health regulatory system neither recognizes
their legitimacy nor oversees their performance. For example,
the Nigerian government made little effort to inform the PMVs
about a change in its guidelines for the treatment of malaria
(Oladepo et al. 2007). On the contrary, national health devel-
opment strategies have tended to ignore the existence of these
unorganized markets for health services. In some cases, the
formal health system actively seeks to diminish their role by,
for example, identifying them as ‘quacks’ and ‘thugs’, who take
advantage of people. Although there is no doubt that the
population needs protection against opportunistic behaviour,
this labelling of all informal providers can also be seen as
boundary protection by licensed professionals and as unhelpful
in the realities of the environments where there is a chronic
scarcity of qualified providers. For example, the Bangladesh
village doctors preferred to refer patients to private doctors,
because government doctors tended to criticize them to their
patients.
On the other hand, the informal providers of health services
and drugs have an identity as small businesses in both
Bangladesh and Nigeria. They are required to obtain business
licenses and are subject to routine inspections. They also face
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harassment by local licensing officials. The Nigerian PMVs have
been organized in trade associations for several decades
(Oladepo et al. 2007). This follows a common pattern for a
number of trades in West Africa (Joshi and Moore 2004). The
National Association of Patent Medicine Dealers was estab-
lished in 1951 and incorporated in 1962. These associations are
organized in a tiered structure, which parallels the levels of
government. They can punish members who supply fake or
expired drugs or sell in unlicensed zones with fines, exclusion
from social events or even expulsion. Many associations
purchase drugs in bulk for their members to reduce the cost
and protect against counterfeit products. They also protect their
members against actions by local government or other actors
that prejudice its members’ ability to earn a living. Interviews
with association officers revealed that they were very interested
in providing clinical knowledge to their members, working with
them to establish standards of treatment and testing drugs to
ensure they were not counterfeit. Bangladesh does not have a
history of this kind of trade association. However, the village
doctors said they were interested in establishing a local
association.
Bangladesh elects its local government officials. These offi-
cials are not responsible for monitoring the performance of
informal providers (Sharmin et al. 2009). However, interviews
with them found they considered this to be an important issue
and were interested in making them more accountable. In
Nigeria, the traditional governance structures are important at
community level. As in Bangladesh, the community leaders are
not responsible for overseeing the performance of PMVs. They
expressed a willingness to work with PMVs to reduce the risk
of sub-standard drugs by using a low-cost testing kit.
Intervening in informal health markets; experience
from Bangladesh and Nigeria
The studies in Bangladesh and Nigeria were carried out by
national research institutions with the twin aims of generating
knowledge and building partnerships for improving the per-
formance of the relevant market system. These studies show
that markets for health-related goods and services have become
strongly entrenched in Bangladesh and Nigeria, and are now an
important source of medical care for the poor. Interventions to
improve their performance need to be based on an understand-
ing of how they operate.
First, it is important to understand where informal providers
obtain health-related expert knowledge. Although these pro-
viders may find it useful to attend a training course, or receive
a booklet, this is likely to be only one of a number of potential
sources of information (accurate or inaccurate). Other inter-
ventions might involve drug wholesalers, the mass media,
advertisers or some form of knowledge intermediary using
mobile telephones or the internet. Second, it is important to
assess the potential impact of an intervention on the livelihoods
of informal providers. They are unlikely to follow advice that
might result in reduced income or lost clients. However, they
may be willing to give up dangerous practices or adopt more
effective treatments if this is linked to public recognition for
good quality service. This is likely to be more successful if
combined with measures to inform the public about why
certain drugs are dangerous or inappropriate. Third, any
intervention needs to take into account the processes through
which providers establish and maintain their reputation.
Potential clients need to have an easy way to identify informal
providers who provide safe and ethical services. In order for an
intervention to succeed, it will be necessary to involve key
stakeholders, such as local health facilities, drug wholesalers,
providers of health-related information, associations of informal
providers and local accountability structures. One potentially
important lever over the performance of informal providers
would be a closer link to government health services, including
an easy way to refer patients.
Given the often diverse interests of these multiple stakehold-
ers, and a context in which many will have a deeply entrenched
distrust of the motivations of other key players, the achievement
of a ‘negotiated settlement’ that is seen as mutually beneficial
(or at least unthreatening) to all sides is a major challenge. It
seems unlikely that this can be achieved in the absence of a
trusted intermediary, who is willing and able to act as an ‘honest
broker’ in those negotiations. The qualifications required of such
an intermediary are considerable. It must be seen by all sides as
possessing both the professional status to adjudicate on ques-
tions of appropriate health care and as beyond the influence of
economic, social and political pressures. In the cases described
below, a research institute is playing that role. Other kinds of
organization play a similar role in other cases.
The Bangladesh intervention combined three elements with
the aim of reducing the supply of dangerous and unnecessary
drugs. ICDDR,B, which led the intervention, produced a
handbook of treatment guidelines for village doctors and
organized a series of training sessions on the appropriate use
of drugs. A sub-district level association, the Shasthya Sen
(Health Soldiers), was established. The village doctors who
passed a post-training evaluation were enlisted in this associ-
ation and permitted to use its logo on visiting cards and
signboards. Members who did not follow the ‘dos and don’ts’
could lose their membership. In order to make village doctors
more accountable to their community, a governing committee
was established with members from a variety of stakeholder
groups, such as government and religious leaders, civil society
organizations, representatives of patients and health experts.
This committee was made responsible for creating criteria for
membership and recertification of members. This local com-
mittee followed the model of the national Health Watch, which
publishes regular monitoring reports.
The Nigeria intervention included the preparation of training
materials on malaria treatment, the involvement of the PMV
associations in organizing training for their members and
overseeing adherence to certain standards (such as discontinu-
ing the sale of monotherapy artesunate and refusing to sell
out-of-date products or those without a certification from the
Food and Drug Administration). These interventions are at an
early stage and one can anticipate a lot of learning about how
best to intervene in these health market systems.
Conclusions
These cases illustrate the need to design interventions for
improving the performance of informal providers in the context
of the market system within which they operate. This includes
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understanding the roles of different actors and the incentives
they face. The focus has been largely on the micro and meso
levels. However, it is important to also recognize macro-level
influences. The emergence of large informal markets reflects
a history of failure by the public health services to meet
the health-related needs of the poor, with the emergence
of markets in response to demands for services and drugs.
The unorganized nature of these markets reflects the unwill-
ingness and inability of government to establish an appropriate
regulatory framework; their future development will be strongly
influenced by government action.
Serious efforts to make long-term improvements will need to
include a clearer definition of the roles and responsibilities of
the public sector in providing services, disseminating health-
related information and participating in the co-regulation of
markets for pharmaceuticals and health services. This, in turn,
will be strongly influenced by the way that the interests and
perspectives of stakeholders, including the poor, are reflected in
policy formulation and implementation. Any recognition of a
legitimate role for informal providers is likely to provoke
resistance, reflecting both a concern for the safety of their
clients and the interests of other stakeholders. One purpose of
the kind of local interventions this paper describes is to inform
debate and negotiations about the future role of these
providers, the state and actors with responsibilities for regula-
tion and/or accountability. They are only a first step in an effort
to bring order to the large unorganized markets for
health-related goods and services which now exist in many
countries. They need to be accompanied by wide consultations
with the public and a variety of actors in health market systems
to build a shared vision of how the majority of the population
can get access to appropriate advice and effective drugs at an
affordable cost. This will have implications for the design of
training programmes, the definition of the roles and responsi-
bilities of the public sector, and the co-creation of institutional
arrangements for effective primary health care services.
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